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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes the operation of both the compulsory pension annuity and 
voluntary annuity markets in the UK. The paper reports on the movement of 
UK annuity price quotes in the voluntary market from 1957-2009, and in the 
pension annuity market from 1994 to 2009, and examines whether annuities 
were fairly priced over this period.  The paper computes the money’s worth of 
annuities, and finds that on average the money’s worth in the voluntary market 
over the sample period for 65-year old males has been a very high 98%. In the 
larger compulsory pension annuity over a shorter sample period we estimate 
that the money’s worth for 65-year old males has been 89%, and for 65-year old 
females has been a similar but slightly larger 90%.  Taking into account load 
factors associated with annuity contracts and in comparison with other 
financial and insurance products this implies that annuities are fairly priced. 
However the value of the money’s worth is sensitive to the assumptions made 
about life expectancy, and we explain the assumptions made about the 
appropriate life tables to apply to annuitants in these annuity markets. There is 
some evidence that money’s worth has fallen since 2002. We discuss a number 
of factors that could have effected the fall in money’s worth, including: changes 
in insurance regulation; changes in industrial concentration; an insurance 
cycle; pricing of mortality uncertainty and the growth in the impaired lives 
market.  
 
JEL Classification: E62, G14, H55 
Keywords: Annuities, annuity markets, pension replacement ratio 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper discusses the operation of both the compulsory pension annuity and 
voluntary annuity markets in the UK, and examines whether annuities in these 
markets were fairly priced. The UK is unusual in having two distinct annuity 
markets: a voluntary segment called the Purchased Life Annuity (PLA) market, 
and a compulsory section called the Compulsory Purchase Annuity (CPA) or 
pension annuity market. The UK government requires that anyone who has 
saved in a tax-privileged private pension, must annuitize 75 per cent of their 
pension wealth in the CPA market at retirement. The voluntary annuities 
market had existed for many years, but was given a boost with a more 
favourable tax-treatment of annuity income in the 1956 Finance Act, and we 
provide a time series of voluntary annuity rates from 1957-2009. The same Act 
introduced the pension annuity market, but it was the Social Security Act 1988 
that provided strong tax incentives for individuals to save in individual defined 
contribution pension schemes, and this has resulted in a strong growth for 
personal pensions.  After a delay (because of the lagged nature of accumulating 
a pension fund), the compulsory annuitization requirement has resulted in an 
increased demand for pension annuities, and we also construct a time series of 
UK annuity price quotes in the pension annuity market from 1994 to 2007. We 
report on the fall in annuity rates in both markets that has occurred since 1994. 
If the fall in annuity rates had happened while everything else remained the 
same, then a consequence would be that the value-for-money of annuities 
would have fallen.  However, over the same period bond yields have fluctuated, 
and there have been substantial upward revisions in projected life expectancy.  
As people live longer, a given sum of money paid for an annuity has to finance a 
longer stream of income and so the zero-profit condition for annuity provides 
means that income per year has to fall.  This reduction in annuity rates is 
unavoidable: the relevant issue is whether the magnitude of the fall in annuity 
rates in the recent past is appropriate given the increases in life expectancy and 
fluctuations in the appropriate discount rates. 
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This paper addresses whether the fall in annuity rates over the period 1994 to 
2009 is larger than could be justified by the fundamental changes in longevity 
and bond yields.  Our analysis centres on calculations of the “money’s worth” 
which is the conventional measure to determine whether annuities are fairly 
priced, and assesses whether the expected present value of the annuity 
payments equals the price of the contract.   
 
In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of the UK annuity markets, and in 
Section 3 we define the money’s worth and review existing research on the 
pricing of annuity contracts.  Section 4 discusses the life expectancy projections 
and other data issues and Section 5 provides the results of our money’s worth 
calculations.  In Section 6 we discuss a number of factors that could have 
affected the fall in money’s worth, including: changes in insurance regulation; 
changes in industrial concentration; an insurance cycle; pricing of mortality 
uncertainty and the growth in the impaired lives market.  Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2 UK ANNUITY MARKETS 
A life annuity is a financial product making a stream of income payments while 
the annuitant is alive. The simplest form of annuity consists of a single payment 
(sometimes called a “premium” or “consideration”) from the annuitant to the 
annuity provider and thereafter the annuity provider pays a constant stream of 
regular payments (monthly, quarterly or annually) until the annuitant’s death. 
More complicated products could have the stream of payments rising over time 
by a fixed amount (an escalating annuity) or rising in line with inflation (real 
annuities).  It is also possible to buy an annuity where the first five years’ 
payments are made regardless of whether the annuitant lives or dies but 
payments thereafter are only made if the annuitant is alive (a guaranteed 
annuity – if the annuitant dies before five years the payments are made to the 
annuitant’s estate). Guaranteed annuities with payments guaranteed for up to 
ten years are also available.  If an annuitant dies before the total payments 
received sum to the purchase price then it is possible to have the difference 
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repaid as a lump sum to the annuitant’s estate (a value protected annuity).  A 
detailed description of these various products is provided in Cannon and Tonks 
(2008). 
 
It is usual for people to buy annuities at retirement to provide a pension 
income.  A life annuity converts the retirement fund into an income stream 
payable to the annuitant until their death, and hence insures the individual 
against insufficient assets to finance consumption due to longevity risk. Yaari 
(1965) demonstrated in a life-cycle model of saving that risk-averse individuals 
should annuitise all of their capital at retirement, since annuititisation protects 
the individual from longevity risk. However, Brown, Mitchell, Poterba and 
Warshawsky (2001) note that the private annuity markets are typically small, 
which is inconsistent with agents getting large utility gains from purchasing 
annuities. Poterba (2001) and Brown (2001) suggest a number of explanations 
for this “annuity puzzle”.  Annuities may be expensive, either due to high 
administrative costs for annuity providers (referred to as “load factors”) or to 
mis-pricing.  Elderly people may prefer to hold their wealth in more liquid 
assets for precautionary reasons or because they wish to bequeath their wealth 
to the next generation.  Demand for private annuities may be low because 
many people receive a state pension which is itself a form of annuity.  In the UK 
individuals at retirement have a significant proportion annuity equivalent 
wealth in state pension rights. The Pension Commission (2004 [ 182]) reports 
that only those individuals whose labour income exceeds about £25,000 per 
year have a sizeable amount of their total wealth in assets other than their state 
pension. Annuity markets may suffer from a particular problem of “adverse 
selection” – since longer-lived individuals benefit more from an annuity than 
shorter-lived individuals, and shorter-lived individuals may leave the market.  
Finally, individuals may dislike annuities for a range of behavioural factors.  
 
Figure 1: Growth in Annuity Sales 1994-2006 (Source: ABI) 
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In the UK there is both a compulsory (Compulsory Purchase Annuity, CPA) 
pensions annuity market and a voluntary (Purchased Life Annuity, PLA) 
market. The UK government requires that anyone who has saved in a tax-
privileged  private pension, must annuitize 75 per cent of their pension wealth. 
However, the annuitization rules allow a private pension saver to defer the 
purchase of an annuity, via income draw-down (or phased withdrawal) which 
generates an income by drawing from the fund itself.   
 
Figure 1 shows the growth in UK annuities and income drawdown over the 
period 1994-2006. By 2006, the compulsory (CPA) market had grown to £9.58 
billion worth of annuity premiums. In contrast, the voluntary (PLA) market 
only amounted to £40.8 million worth of sales, and the diagram shows that the 
PLA market has shrunk as the CPA market has grown, probably reflecting some 
substitution between compulsory and voluntary annuities. The bulk annuity 
market (where an annuity provider acquires a package of individual pension 
liabilities, typically, because the sponsor of a defined benefit occupational 
scheme has become insolvent), has been volatile, but as yet there has not been 
the predicted surge in transfers from defined benefit schemes to bulk buy-outs 
as suggested in the Pension Commission Reports. Income drawdown continues 
to represent a significant alternative to annuitization. 
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Table 1:  Scenarios for the size of the annuity market, 
(estimated annual flows: £ billion) 
 2002 2012 
  Low Medium High 
Individual annuities 7.2 16.6 18.1 19.7 
Drawdown 2.3 5.3 5.8 6.3 
Bulk buyout 1.4 1.5 35.4 128.1 
Source: Pension Commission (2005, Figure 5.16) 
 
Watson-Wyatt (2003) and Wadsworth (2005) examine a number of scenarios 
for the growth of annuity demand over the ten-year period 2002-2012, 
reproduced in Table 1  taken from Figure 5.16 in Pensions Commission (2005). 
According to the Pension Commission’s Second Report and reiterated in HM 
Treasury (2006), the main driver in these estimates is the maturity of individual 
and company defined benefit schemes. As increasing numbers of personal 
pension schemes mature, this will result in an increased demand for pension 
annuities. Table 1 shows that the demand for annuities could increase from 
about £7 billion in 2002 to between £16-£20 billion by 2012. But these numbers 
could increase dramatically if existing defined benefit schemes are closed and 
replaced by bulk buyouts of annuities. Then depending on the extent of this 
switch, the demand for annuities in the UK could increase by up to £128 billion.  
 
The Pensions Commission (2006) proposed the introduction of a national 
pensions savings scheme as part of a wider package of pension reform, and 
these recommendations are being implemented in the proposed “Personal 
Accounts” outlined in Department of Work and Pensions (2006). This new 
pension scheme is a defined contribution scheme, and this will also need to be 
annuitized at retirement.1 The Pensions Commission (2005) also suggests that if 
the proposed national pension savings scheme successfully targets that group of 
                                                           
1
 Legislation for personal accounts, as well as automatic enrolment and minimum employer 
contributions  is going through parliament at the time of writing this document. 
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the population who currently are not provided for, they estimate that in the 
steady state this will represent an annual demand for annuities of £13 billion by 
the year 2040 at current earnings levels. This demand represents an additional 
increase on the numbers in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
 
All of this evidence suggests that the demand for annuities in the UK will 
continue to rise substantially in the coming years, and therefore examining the 
functioning of the annuities market is relevant and timely for public policy. The 
UK government has emphasized its commitment to the compulsory 
annuitization requirements (Department of Work and Pensions, 2002; HM 
Treasury, 2006) that at least 75 per cent of the funds in a tax-efficient pension 
scheme should be used to finance a pension income, which is referred to as 
“securing” an income since A-day in April 2006. Though, the Pensions 
Commission notes that any capacity problems in the compulsory annuities 
market could be eased by allowing a relaxation of these rules, or by encouraging 
delayed retirement. 
 
Annuities and Taxation 
The developments of both voluntary and compulsory annuity markets in the 
UK have been affected by the taxation of annuity payments and the treatment 
of accumulated pension savings. Cannon and Tonks (2008) document the 
history of voluntary annuities.  After a long period of stagnation in the early 
20th century the UK annuities market was given a dramatic boost under the 
1956 Finance Act which implemented the main recommendations of the 1954 
Millard Tucker No. 2 Committee on the introduction of tax efficient personal 
pensions for the self-employed. This meant that the self-employed were treated 
the same as the employed sector who had enjoyed the benefits of tax efficient 
occupational pension schemes for a number of years. 
 
Following the Act, individuals could obtain tax relief on contributions into an 
approved pension contract, and at retirement would be required to annuitize 
the fund that had been built up, through a new compulsory-purchase annuities 
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market for those who had built up a personal pension fund, distinct from the 
existing voluntary annuities market.  Further, the returns to investments in the 
pension fund of life-assurance companies during the accumulation part of the 
pension contract would be exempt from tax.   
 
An additional part of the 1956 Act also affected the tax treatment of voluntary 
annuities: a fixed proportion of the annuity payment for purchased life 
annuities was to be regarded as a run-down of capital, and an annuitant would 
only be liable for income tax on the balance. These changes stimulated the 
demand for annuities in the UK, and Table 2 shows the sales of voluntary 
annuities averaged over 5-yearly intervals from the 1950s onwards. The 
numbers of annuities purchased each year vary greatly, though the value of the 
lump sum used to purchase an annuity contract has grown steadily from £106 
million in the late 1960s to £650 million in the first half of the 1990s.  The 
overall trend increase during this period was due to the increase in private 
pensions that were reaching the point of retirement.   
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Table 2: Growth in number and value of purchased life annuities, pension annuities and 
outstanding personal pension schemes 1954-2005: Annual averages over successive 5-year 
periods 
 1951/55 1956/60 1961/65 1966/70 1971/75 1976/80 1981/85 1986/90 1991/95 1996/00 2001/2005 
Panel A: New Purchased Life Annuities (Immediate and Deferred) (Voluntary Market) 
No. of new annuity policies per year 
(000s) 
. . . 33.8 173.2 67.6 84.2 67.8 65.4 13.8 3.1 
Premiums on new immediate annuity 
policies (£ m) 
. . . 106.0 235.3 159.6 394.5 432.2 650.4 444.8 163.7 
Annuity pay-outs per annum (£m) 0.7 1.6 . 12.7 44.0 25.1 66.2 80.5 129.8 39.2 n/a 
            
Panel B: New Pension Annuities (Compulsory market) 
Premiums on new immediate pension annuities (£million)       2,794.6 5,178.4 7,269 
Pension annuity pay-outs per annum (£m)        276.4 446.2 n/a 
            
Personal Pensions in Force            
No. of Policies (000s) . 83.9 . . 620.0 1,309.4 3,151.4 8,835.2 17,916.0 20,810.2 22,900.8 
Yearly premiums (£m) . 10.6 . . 68.0 212.6 758.1 2,451.6 4,876.2 6,497.6 9,236.0 
 
Source: Life Offices' Association; Association of British Insurers 
 
The combination of various forms of personal and occupational pensions, 
together with frequent changes in regulation and tax policy meant that the 
system of taxation for pensions was highly confusing by the beginning of the 
21st Century.  The Government Green Paper (DWP, 2002) recognized this 
confusion and the consequent 2004 Finance Act simplified the system: changes 
came into effect on 6 April 2006, commonly referred to as ‘A-day’, under which 
the tax system in the UK was changed to a lifetime allowance.  At retirement 
the maximum pension fund which bears no additional tax liability was set at 
£1.5million on A-day, rising annually thereafter.  The maximum amount that 
could be paid into this pension fund was £215,000 per year.  This means that an 
individual with a large number of pension schemes, which might have had 
different tax rules and annuitization requirements, was subsequently able to 
aggregate the entire fund and buy a single annuity. 
 
In addition under the A-day changes the compulsion to purchase an annuity 
was altered in several ways: it was strengthened by raising the minimum 
pension age to 55 (effective in 2010); but weakened by increasing access to 
pension funds through means other than an annuity.  Following A-day, there 
are now three ways in which a tax-privileged pension may be accessed: a) 
secured income; b)unsecured income; and c) alternatively secured income 
 
According to regulations laid down by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC), securing an income can be achieved either by purchasing an annuity 
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in the “compulsory purchase” market (secured income) or drawing down a 
tightly prescribed income from the pension fund (alternatively secured 
income).  However, the requirement to secure an income only requires that it 
be secure by the age of 75, and an individual can choose to have unsecured 
income in the period between retirement and age 75.  Unsecured income is also 
referred to as income drawdown. 
 
Under HMRC rules, the amounts of the three types of allowable pension 
income that the pensioner can receive depends on the annuity rate.  With 
secured income (buying an annuity) this is obvious.  With an unsecured income 
before 75, the maximum amount drawn in each year is 120 per cent of the best 
level single-life annuity payment at the respective age and sex available in the 
compulsory purchase market (these rates are collected and published by the 
FSA).  With alternatively secured income (post age 75), it is compulsory to draw 
between 65 and 90 per cent of the best annuity rate aged 75, and payments 
received outside this range are taxed at 40 per cent. The justification for the 
requirement to secure income by 75 is that savings in these pension plans are 
tax-advantaged, and that the reason for the tax relief in the first place is to 
encourage individuals to save for a pension.2   
 
3 DEFINITION OF THE MONEY’S WORTH 
To calculate the fair vale of an annuity we can calculate the expected 
discounted annuity payments promised by the annuity provider, based on the 
annuity rates that we have collected and compare this value with the actual 
cost. This statistic is called the “money’s worth”. It is the ratio of the expected 
present value of the flow of payments made by an annuity to the money paid 
for an annuity. For a general discussion of the calculation of the money’s worth 
see the introduction to the collection of papers in Brown et al (2001). 
 
                                                           
2
 With unsecured income and alternatively secured income there are further restrictions or tax 
considerations for any capital sum left on the death of an individual: these are to discourage 
using unsecured income or alternatively secured income to effect inter-generational transfers. 
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To calculate the money’s worth approach: define the annuity rate At as the 
annuity payment received by an individual made per year per £1 purchase price 
in year t.3 The expected present value of this annuity stream is called the 
money’s worth.  For a level annuity with no guarantee period, this can be 
calculated using  
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where 
,t t iπ +  is the probability of someone living i  more periods, believed in 
period t . T  is chosen so that , 0t t Tπ + ≈ and ,t iR  is the appropriate discount rate 
in  period t  for payments received in period t i+ , expressed at an annual rate. 
  
Notice that annuitants of different ages or sexes would have different values of 
,t t iπ +  since the probability of living a given length of time depends upon both 
age and sex.  Clearly the annuity rate 
t
A  will also depend upon age and sex. 
 
We calculate the money’s worth using the term structure of interest rates at 
date t and expectations of survival probabilities 
,t t iπ +  that we believe were 
available at time t.  
 
With a zero load factor, under fair pricing the money’s worth would be exactly 
equal to unity, and hence money’s worth will reflect whether annuities are 
fairly priced. However, any positive load factor will result in the money’s worth 
being less than unity. 4  
                                                           
3
 It is possible for the annuity rate to depend upon the purchase price as discussed in Cannon 
and Tonks (2005). 
4
 Typical costs incurred by an annuity provider and thus included in the load 
factor are: the administration costs of sale and delivery of the annuity contracts, 
including the payments system; the transactions costs of purchasing assets to 
match the liability incurred by the insurance company when it sets up the 
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A number of studies have examined the extent to which annuity prices are 
actuarially fair. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) suggest that 
the market is approximately efficient and that annuities are not actuarially mis-
priced in the USA. In their analyses of the UK annuity market Murthi, Orszag 
and Orszag (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and Cannon and Tonks 
(2004a, 2009) all report similar results that annuities are approximately fairly 
priced in the UK by computing an annuity’s money’s worth.5  
 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) calculate the money’s worth of voluntary 
annuities for 65-year old men, to be 99 per cent, using data from a cross-
sectional sample of annuity providers in the year 1998. In comparison, Murthi, 
Orszag and Orszag (1999) reported a figure of 93 per cent, and Cannon and 
Tonks’ (2004a) calculated a value of 98 per cent in the same year.  Murthi et al 
(1999) also provide money’s worth estimates of 100 per cent in 1990 and 92 per 
cent in 1994:  Cannon and Tonks’ (2004a) analogous figures are 98 per cent and 
89 per cent.  Cannon and Tonks’ (2004a) figure of 98 per cent for 1990 is based 
upon the money’s worth calculated using the a(90) table, but using the IM80 
table (which was only published in that year), the figure would be 103 per cent.  
Thus over a period of eight years, using different estimates of life expectancy 
and using different data sets of annuity rates the range of estimates for the 
money’s worth of just one type of annuity is quite large, varying from 89 per 
cent to 103 per cent  
 
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) specifically assess the degree of adverse 
selection in annuities markets, and find evidence of adverse selection in the 
voluntary annuity market. They note that it is difficult to distinguish between 
adverse selection and passive selection (purchasers of annuities tend to be 
richer and therefore longer-lived), and recognise the limitations of their small 
                                                                                                                                                                      
annuity contract and all of the on-going costs of managing these assets; and the 
costs arising from the remaining risks faced by the annuity provider.   
5
 James and Song (2001) report that annuities are fairly priced in a number of other countries. 
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sample from a single annuity provider.  Cannon and Tonks (2004a) assess the 
fair-pricing of UK annuities over a much longer time period 1957-2002, and for 
data from a wide range of annuity providers. They report that over the whole 
period 1957-2002, the average money’s worth of voluntary annuities was 97 per 
cent and conclude that annuities are fairly priced over this time period.  
Cannon and Tonks (2009) computes the money’s worth of compulsory 
annuities over the period 1994-2007, and find that on average the money’s 
worth over the sample period for 65-year old males has been 90 per cent, and 
for 65-year old females was a similar but slightly larger 91 per cent.   
  
4 DATA FOR MONEY’S WORTH CALCULATIONS 
As can be seen in Section 3, three data series are needed for our money’s worth 
calculations: annuity rates, interest rates and survival probabilities.  In this 
section we discuss each data series in turn. 
 
4.1 Annuity rate data: Purchased Life Annuities (Voluntary) 
 
The only long-run time series of annuity rates for the UK is that constructed by 
Cannon and Tonks (2004b) for the voluntary annuities market for the period 
1957-2002, which provides a detailed discussion of the voluntary market data.  
This data are primarily for level immediate voluntary annuities purchased for 
1957 to 2002: data from 1973 onwards are for annuities with a 5-year guarantee 
and earlier data have no guarantee.  According to Stark (2002) over 70 per cent 
of purchased annuities are level annuities, so the series are reasonably 
representative: more importantly historical data are not available for any other 
types of annuity.  The data were collected from a series of trade magazines such 
as Pensions World and Money Management for the later period and The Policy 
for the earlier period, and are for various annuity providers for both men and 
women of different ages.  In the current paper we update this data using quoted 
annuity rates for the voluntary sector provided by Moneyfacts up to March 
2009.  This enables us to construct a single series of average annuity rates in the 
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voluntary market from 1957-2009. Annuity prices are usually quoted in the form 
of an annual annuity payment of £X per £10,000 purchased, which we refer to as 
an annuity rate of X/100 per cent.  In most of our analysis we use the average 
annuity rate across firms calculated from these data, although in practice 
annuitants may purchase only the higher priced annuities. 
 
Figure 2 plots a time series of voluntary rates for men aged 65 and 70, and for 
women aged 65, over the period 1994 to 2009. It can be seen that annuity rates 
for men are consistently higher than for women of the same age; and that 
annuity rates are higher as age increases. Age and sex are two personal 
characteristics that annuity-providers condition on when quoting annuity 
prices, since life expectancy of women is higher than men, and of younger 
adults is higher than older adults. The striking aspect of this graph is the extent 
to which the series move together:  we should expect this since the major cause 
of variation in annuity rates over a period as short as this is the variation in the 
entire term structure of interest rates – and clearly all annuity rates at any given 
point in time are based on the same term structure of interest rates.i 
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Figure 2: Voluntary annuity rates by age and gender 
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Figure 3 illustrates an annual annuity rate series for men aged 65 over a longer 
time period; and for comparison, a 10-year bond yield is also plotted as a 
representative long term interest rate. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 2 for three sub-periods and also for the period as a whole (the annuity 
series for 1957 to 2009 created by splicing the series together). As can be seen 
from Figure 3, the series are highly correlated and the difference between them 
appears to be falling over time.   
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Figure 3: Voluntary annuity rates for men aged 65 and Bond Yields 
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The long-term bond yield was roughly the same in both 1957 and 2009, making 
comparison of the beginning and end of the period straightforward.  Although 
bond yields were the same, annuity rates were considerably lower in 2009 than 
in 1957.  Cannon and Tonks (2004a) show that all of this narrowing is due to 
increases in longevity: as life expectancy increases the gap between the annuity 
rate and the bond yield (‘mortality drag’) will narrow.ii  
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Table 2: Annual Time Series Properties on Voluntary Annuity and Bond 
Yields 1957-2009 
 
 
Annuity Rate  
 
(%) 
10-year UK 
bond yield 
(IMF) 
 
(%) 
Difference 
between 
Annuity Rate 
- Bond yield 
(%) 
Panel A: 1957-1973    
Mean 11.79 7.07 4.73 
St.Dev. 1.16 1.68  
Correlation 0.94  
Panel B: 1972-1993    
Mean 14.09 11.54 2.56 
St. Dev. 1.68 2.10  
Correlation 0.92  
Panel C: 1994-2009    
Mean 8.04 5.57 2.47 
St.Dev. 1.76 1.46  
Correlation 0.95  
Panel D: 1957-2009    
Mean 11.57 8.37 3.20 
St.Dev. 2.98 3.21  
Correlation 0.92  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the annual time series of average annuity rates and 
consol rates over the period 1957 to 2009 and for three sub-periods. 
 
In addition to the gradual trend of a narrowing gap between annuity and consol 
rates, there is also a temporary narrowing of the gap in the mid 1970s when all 
interest rates were high.  The likely reason for this is that when interest rates 
are high, the present value of future payments in the relatively distant future 
contribute very little to the total present value of an asset and most of the 
present value of the asset depends upon payments in the very near future.  
Since the probability of annuity payments in the near future is very high, the 
expected present value of the annuity payments for the near future is almost 
the same as the expected present value of a bond.  Of course, this reasoning 
relies upon annuities being priced fairly, but all of the evidence we shall present 
below suggests that this is approximately the case. 
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4.2 Annuity rate data: Compulsory Purchase Life Annuities (Pension anuities) 
 
Having discussed the voluntary annuities market, in this section we focus on 
nominal and real compulsory purchase annuities, bought by individuals who 
have received tax-breaks in accumulating pension funds, and who must 
annuitize a proportion of that fund and purchase annuities in the compulsory 
purchase market where annuity rates are slightly better, possibly due to fewer 
selection effects as argued in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002). 
 
We report data on quoted annuity rates provided by MoneyFacts over the 
period 1994-2007. Although the voluntary market data goes back to 1957, for 
much of that period the compulsory annuity market was very small and no data 
are available.  In this section the data we use are quoted annuity rates for the 
compulsory annuity market provided by Moneyfacts from July 1994 to March 
2009.  As in the voluntary market we compute average annuity rates from the 
various annuity providers for both men and women of different ages. 
MoneyFacts provide annuity quotes for level annuities with no guarantee that 
pay a constant monthly income stream over the lifetime of the annuitant. 
MoneyFacts also publish RPI-linked annuities, which pay an annuity income 
that rises in line with the UK’s Retail Price Index, and hence provides 
protection against inflation to the annuitant. 
 
Cannon and Tonks (2004b) discuss potential problems with inferring an 
average annuity rate from a cross-section of annuity quotes in the voluntary 
market from a wide range of sources, because of changes due to composition 
bias. In our data set on the compulsory market, we have a consistent source of 
data and any changes in the number of prices available are due to changes in 
the number of actual providers: in most cases we can identify changes in the 
number of prices with merger or acquisition of one provider by another.  
Although prices of individual providers rarely change on a monthly basis, 
changes are sufficiently frequent that there is not reason to believe that any 
prices are stale. 
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Figure 4 
Annuity Rates in the Compulsory Annuity Market for Males
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Figure 5 
Annuity Rates in the Compulsory Annuity Market for Females
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Figures 4 and 5 plots a series of monthly annuity rates for men and women aged 
65 and 75 over the period (75-year olds annuity rates were only quoted in 
Money Facts from August 1997 and RPI-linked annuities were only quoted from 
September 1998 – in addition two months’ data are missing).  It can be seen 
that annuity prices move closely together, largely in line with interest rates. 
 
As with the voluntary market annuity rates for men are consistently higher 
than for women of the same age; and that annuity rates are higher for both men 
and women as age increases. The annuity rates on guaranteed annuities always 
lie below non-guaranteed annuities, and the rates on index-linked annuities lie 
below those on nominal annuities. Like the voluntary market the striking 
aspect of Figures 4 and 5 is the extent to which the series move together. 
 
Figure 6 reveals that the number of main annuity providers during this period 
has fallen significantly: in 1994 MoneyFacts reports 23 to 25 quotes, but this falls 
to about nine quotes by the end of the period.  The FSA web-site also has also 
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reported about nine or ten annuity prices over the period 2005 to 2007.  It 
should be noted that that some of the annuity providers only supply enhanced 
or similarly-restricted annuities, such as B&CE Insurance which supplies 
annuities to former construction workers. The number of annuities quoted for 
this part of the market has actually grown (some of these are provided by 
companies that also provide non-enhanced annuities).  Figure 6 also shows that 
not all annuity providers quote for RPI-linked annuities in Money Facts.  
 
Figure 6 
Number of annuity quotes in Money Facts
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Although the number of annuity providers quoting annuity prices in the 
Moneyfacts database has fallen, insurance companies may still be willing to 
provide annuities if contacted directly by individuals or annuity brokers, for 
example they will sell annuities to those who have built up pension savings 
with the company. According to the FSA life insurance returns 62 insurance 
companies sold compulsory annuities in 2005, and in Figure 7 we reproduce the 
distribution of non-profit compulsory annuity sales in 2005 across the largest 23 
of the 39 parent companies that sold annuities (since a parent company may 
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submit more than one insurance return for its subsidiary companies).6 These 23 
companies sold £7,398 million of CPA non-profit annuities in 2005 out of a total 
of £7,433 million for this category. There were a small number of other 
categories of compulsory annuities sold in 2005: with-profit annuities (£229 
million), RPI-linked (£510 million), impaired-life (£387 million), but these are 
not included in the figure.  
 
Figure 7 shows that the CPA market is dominated by a small number of 
insurance companies, and the number in this figure imply that the five-firm 
concentration ratio is 72 per cent for these annuity sales, with the Prudential 
the largest supply of compulsory annuities having over 23 per cent of new 
business in 2005. 7 
 
The ten annuity providers identified as quoting annuity prices from the 
MoneyFacts database in August 2005, were AXA, Canada Life, Clerical Medical 
(HBOS), Friends Provident, Legal & General, Norwich Union (Aviva), 
Prudential, Scottish Equitable (AEGON), Scottish Widows (Lloyds TSB), and 
Standard Life. By comparing these providers with the sales of annuities in 2005 
from the FSA returns, it would appear that our dataset contains price quotes 
from all the major providers. 
 
                                                           
6
 Form 47, Synthesis Database 
7
 The five-firm concentration ratio shows the percentage of total industry annuity sales 
contracted by the largest five annuity providers. 
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Figure 7:  
 
Distribution of CPA Annuity Sales in 2005 across Parent Companies
Source: Synthesis 2005, FSA Life Returns, Form 47  line 400
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We may also examine the pattern in the concentration ratio over time. In 
Figure 8 we plot the six-firm concentration ratio from 1985-2005 of CPA sales. 
This figure is based on the CPA annuity sales of the individual company FSA 
returns, rather than aggregate sales across the parent companies.  Ideally an 
analysis of market concentration would use data at parent company level, but 
insurance company mergers would make it very difficult to extract the parent 
information in a particular year and thus we confine our analysis to the 
individual companies. Because we are analysing individual companies Figure 8 
may understate the true degree of concentration, but this effect is likely to be 
small. For example in 2005, Figure 8 reveals that the six-firm concentration 
ratio was 68 per cent (based on individual company returns) compared the five-
firm concentration value of 72 per cent (based on the parent company’s 
returns) derived from Figure 7. 
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Figure 8:  
Six firm concentration ratio 1985-2005 in CPA Market  
(Based on individual company FSA returns)
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Figure 9 provides a comparison of annuity rates in the compulsory market with long-term interest rates. 
It compares the nominal annuity rate for 65-year-old males with the UK government ten-year bond 
yield. It can be seen that the two series clearly move very closely together, although the annuity rate is 
slightly smoother. In addition figure 8 also plots the yield on corporate bonds yield. 
iii
 The figure also 
plots the inflation-adjusted annuity rate in the real annuity market and the real government bond yield. 
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Figure 9 
Monthly Comparison of Annuity Rates with Bond Yields
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Descriptive statistics for pension annuity rates in the compulsory market and 
bond yields are presented in Table 3 for the period as a whole, and for two sub-
periods. As expected, the series are highly correlated, but this correlation has 
decreased from 0.97 in the late 1990s through to 2002 to 0.49 over the last seven 
years.  The difference between the two series is falling over time because as life 
expectancy increases, the expected payment stream from an annuity becomes 
more similar to that of a conventional bond. The lower correlation over the 
latter part of the sample appears to be driven by the higher short-term volatility 
in bond yields: bond yields have become more volatile, but annuity yields have 
not responded to this volatility on a month-by-month basis.  The annuity rate 
was 9.9 per cent between 1994-2000, but had fallen to 7.2 per cent over the 
second half of the dataset for 2001-2007.  Table 3 also reports the yields on 
corporate bonds, and this has averaged about 90 basis points above the yield on 
government bonds8. Using the corporate bond rate as the appropriate discount 
rate, or including the risk premium on corporate bonds, will therefore reduce 
the present value of annuity payments, and hence  reduce the money’s worth. 
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Table 3: Monthly Time Series Properties on Pension Annuity for 65-year 
old males and 10-year Bond Rates 
 
 
Annuity Rate 
for 65-year 
old males  
(%) 
10 year 
Government 
Bond Yield 
(%) 
Commercial 
Bank Bond 
Yield (%) 
Difference 
(%) in 
Annuity Rate 
and 
Government 
Bond Yield 
Panel A: Aug 1994 – Jan 2002 
Mean 9.67 6.27 6.83 3.41 
St.Dev. 1.15 1.43 1.20  
Correlation 0.97   
Panel B: Feb 2002 – Apr 2009 
Mean 6.96 4.58 4.91 2.38 
St. Dev. 0.34 0.39 0.45  
Correlation 0.49   
Panel C: Aug 1994 – Apr 2009 
Mean 8.33 5.43 5.88 2.90 
St. Dev. 1.60 1.35 1.32  
Correlation 0.92   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the monthly time series of average annuity rates in the 
CPA market, government rates and commercial bond rates over the period 1994 to 2009 and for 
the two sub-periods. 
 
 
4.3 Interest rates and the term structure 
 
The term structure of interest rates is available on a detailed basis on the Bank 
of England’s web site.  The Monetary Instruments and Markets Division of the 
Bank of England estimates nominal and real yield curves for the United 
Kingdom on a daily basis. These estimates are based on yields on UK 
government bonds and on yields in the general collateral repo market. They are 
constructed by fitting a smooth curve through data points for rates of return on 
government stock of different maturities, as described in Anderson and Sleath 
(1999).  However the current published series were only calculated from 1999 
and so these estimates would not have been available in this form to insurance 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8
 We use the Datastream corporate bond index rather than the Merrill Lynch index, since the 
two series are highly correlated, but the Merrill series only started in 1997. 
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companies pricing annuities contemporaneously between 1994-1999.  Up to 
1999, published yield curve data was available in Financial Statistics for 
representative government bonds at 5, 10 and 20 years, and it would have been 
possible to infer rates of return on intermediate maturities by interpolation or 
on longer maturities by extrapolation. In Cannon and Tonks (2004a) we 
compared the current Bank of England term structure series for 1979-2002 with 
the interpolated series, and found that the results were very similar. Therefore 
in the current analysis we will rely solely on the Bank of England term structure 
series for 1994-2007.   
 
What are the implications of the shape of the term structure for the pricing of 
annuities? Consider the optimal investment strategy for the annuity provider: 
to meet future liabilities a long way into the future the life insurer can either a) 
make a single purchase of an asset making a payment at that point in the (long-
distant) future: when the payment is received then the funds are automatically 
available to meet the life insurer’s liability to make the annuity payment; or b) 
invest money short term and continuously re-invest it until it is needed for the 
annuity payment. 
 
Historically, most of the time the yield curve has sloped up: the interest rate per 
annum for payments a long way in the future is higher than for those in the 
near future.  This means that the obvious strategy for a life insurer selling an 
annuity is to match annuity payment liabilities that are a long way in the future 
with financial products making payments a long way in the future.  There are 
three advantages to this approach. First, buying long-dated assets has a higher 
rate of return. Second, it involves less administrative costs, since only one 
transaction is needed rather than continuous transactions as short-term 
investments are rolled over. Third, there is no risk, since the payment in the 
future from a government bond is certain (government default risk is clearly 
negligible in the UK), while investing short term and rolling over the 
investment is risky as short-term rates of return are variable.  Given these 
advantages the FSA strongly encourages life insurers to match their annuity 
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liabilities with an appropriate mix of assets with differing maturities and the life 
insurers are obliged to provide details of their asset portfolio in the FSA returns, 
which show that they do behave in this way. 
 
For this reason it is appropriate to use the rates of return from the term 
structure to obtain the present value of annuity obligations.  One slight 
problem arises, however, when the yield curve slopes down (ie long-term 
interest rates are less than short-term interest rates) as has been the case in the 
UK recently.  In this situation investing short term and rolling over the 
investment has a higher expected return on average; but this is at the expense 
of there being higher risk.  If this risk were sufficiently low then it might be 
optimal for life insurers to invest short term and it would not be appropriate for 
us to value annuity liabilities using the term structure. 
 
However, we believe it more appropriate to continue to use interest rates drawn 
from the term structure even in this situation.  First, data limitations mean that 
there is little alternative: clearly there is no independent source of information 
on future short-term interest rates or the value of risk in investing short term 
and rolling over investments rather than investing long term (indeed, the 
obvious way to estimate these values would be to use the term structure, which 
brings us back to where we started).  Second, it is not clear that life insurers 
have used such a strategy, or that the regulator would allow them to do so. 
 
We will use term structure projections in the computation of money’s worth in 
Section III. Form 49 of the FSA insurance returns provides information on the 
types of bonds in which life insurance companies invest. Figure 9 shows that 
the mixture of government bonds (approved) and corporate bonds (other) has 
shifted over time: in 1985 life insurance companies held five times as many 
government bonds as corporates, by 2005 this ratio was almost one, though 
over most of the sample, 1989 to 2004, the percentage of debt instruments that 
were government bonds lay between 60 and 70 per cent. 
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Figure 9:  
Type of Debt Instrument held by Life Insurance Companies
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Source: Synthesis, 2005 
 
4.3 Life expectancy 
  
We now turn to the behaviour of life expectancy over the period 1994 to 2009.  
Clearly annuities are (or should be) priced on future life expectancy, so we are 
dealing with past values of expectations about the then future (much of which 
is still in the future).  Cannon and Tonks (2008) discuss many of the issues in 
working out what expectations of mortality might have been in the past, using 
the actuarial tables that were available at various points from 1950 onwards.  
The period in which we are interested saw some major revisions to actuarial 
projections and this means that changes in expectations are the largest cause of 
changes in annuity rates over this period.  
 
Two initial issues that we need to consider are the fact that annuitants may 
have different life expectancy from other individuals, and voluntary annuitants 
may have different life expectancy from pension annuitants.  The life 
expectancy of pensioners is quite different from that of the population as a 
whole, and there is also considerable variation in life expectancy between the 
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different sorts of pensioners for which data are available.  A large quantity of 
data is collected by the Institute of Actuaries and analysed by the Continuous 
Mortality Investigation (CMI) Committee which publishes its results at regular 
intervals, typically publishing the data for four-year periods (“quadrennia”).  
We follow Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and our own analysis in Cannon and 
Tonks (2004a) in using the CMI data.  The CMI collects data for individuals 
with the following types of pension: 
1. Immediate annuities, which would be appropriate for the analysis of 
annuities purchased voluntarily in the “purchase life” market; 
2. Retirement annuity contracts (RACs), an early version of personal 
pension introduced in 1957 primarily designed for self-employed workers 
to have a mechanism to receive the tax privileges available to workers in 
company pension schemes; 
3. Personal Pensions (PP), introduced in 1987 and for which the data set is 
small until about 1995, since most such pensions are still in accrual 
rather than in payment; 
4. Life office pensions, which are company pension schemes administered 
by life insurers and for which the most comprehensive data are available; 
5. Self-Administered Pension schemes, ie, company pension schemes, 
typically for large companies, which are run by the company without 
recourse to life offices (although they would be advised by actuarial 
consultancy firms).9  The CMI has started collecting these data only very 
recently and hardly any data are available. 
 
Summary statistics of some of these data are shown in Table 4, which illustrates 
the small size of the voluntary annuity market, the relatively large size of the 
RAC market and the phenomenal growth of the PP market. The Table shows 
the number of annuitants by annuity-type over various quadrennia, and the 
associated death rates for each group. 
                                                           
9
 Self-Administered Pension schemes (SAPs) are those self administered by the company and 
should not be confused with Self-Invested Personal Pensions (SIPPs) which are a form of 
personal pension, where investment decisions are taken by the pensioner. 
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Table 4: CMI Estimates of numbers of annuitants and death rates by categories of annuity 
types 
 Males Females 
 1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 1999-2002 
Panel A: Immediate annuitants 
Exposed to risk (000) 50 40 31 36 101 74 52 53 
Crude death rate 0.081 0.075 0.074 0.072 0.076 0.082 0.086 0.082 
Panel B: Retirement annuities in accrual 
Exposed to risk (000) 6,358 4,511 3,795 3,880 1,097 829 672 679 
Crude death rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Panel C: Retirement annuities in payment 
Exposed to risk (000) 648 641 638 893 134 151 156 291 
Crude death rate 0.035 0.032 0.03 0.033 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 
Panel D: Personal pensions in accrual 
Exposed to risk (000) 1,332 3,831 6,043 8,563 593 1,883 2,998 4,327 
Crude death rate 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Panel E: Personal pensions in payment 
Exposed to risk (000) 2 50 207 692 0.6 20 84 294 
Crude death rate 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.006 
Source: CMI 21 (2004) 
 
Clearly in an ideal world we would use immediate annuitant life expectancy 
data for the voluntary annuities, and the Personal Pensions life expectancy data 
for pension annuities, since most people who purchase annuities in the 
compulsory-purchase market are classified as Personal Pensioners by the CMI, 
since we would like to ensure consistency in the data.  However, as can be seen 
from Panel E in the table, it is only recently that significant numbers of 
individuals with personal pensions have been monitored by the CMI and so 
these data alone could not be used reliably for projection into the future.  
Furthermore they were first published only in 2004 (although a smaller sample 
had been available before then) and so were unavailable for most of the period.   
 
An alternative would be to use the RAC life expectancy for pension annuities, 
but Panel C in Table 4 above suggests that the death rate of such pensioners is 
twice as high as the death rate of personal pensioners (looking at pensions in 
payment rather than in accrual) and hence the life expectancy is much lower.  
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In fact these summary statistics exaggerate the difference since the average age 
of RAC pensioners is higher than PP pensioners, but differences remain even 
when we disaggregate the data by age.  This difference in life expectancy may 
be because the two groups have different socio-economic characteristics.  A 
possible explanation is that originally purchasers of RACs were self-employed 
and thus they may have different characteristics from people in employment: 
certainly they are likely to have worked in different occupations and this may 
explain some difference in life expectancy (some occupations have significantly 
different life expectancies from others: eg construction workers tend to have 
lower life expectancy). 
 
Since the number of RAC pensioners in accrual has fallen by 7.5 to 4.6 million 
over the period, coinciding with an increase of PP pensioners in accrual from 
1.9 to 12.9 million, it is almost certain that some individuals who would have 
taken up RACs are now taking up PPs (as we would have expected) and this 
would suggest that their life expectancies would be similar.  However, there 
have also been changes in the composition of the workforce and this effect may 
be larger. 
 
Given the problems with interpreting RAC and PP life expectancy it seems 
prudent to follow Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and resort to a larger and 
more consistent set of data, namely the Life Office Pensioners, of whom there 
were over one million in 1999-2002 and for whom data are available for a longer 
period of time.  Use of the Life Office Pensioner data has the additional 
advantage that life expectancy is available on both a lives and an amounts 
basis.10  The former shows the life expectancy of each life (possibly more 
accurately of each policy – if a pensioner has more than one policy then he or 
she may be counted twice).  The latter basis re-weights the life expectancy by 
                                                           
10
 In the Results section we will refer to PML (Pensioner Male Lives) as Life Office Pensioner 
data for males based on lives. Similarly, PFA (Pensioner Female Amounts) refers to Life Office 
Pensioner data for females based on amounts. The most recent life expectancy tables also refer 
to PNML (Pensioner Male Normal Lives) to distinguish between those people retiring at normal 
retirement age as distinct from early retirees. 
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the size of the pension so that richer pensioners have a higher weight – 
unsurprisingly life expectancy of amounts is longer than life expectancy of lives 
since richer people tend to live longer.  From the point of view of the Life 
Office, what matters is the amounts measure, since that is what determines the 
profitability of the life business: from the point of view of a “typical” pensioner 
the lives basis may be more relevant in terms of the “value for money” of the 
annuity.11 
 
We now turn to the way in which actuaries have projected life expectancy over 
the relevant period.  Since their projection methods have changed, this will 
involve a summary history of actuarial thinking.  It is not possible to identify 
how actuaries in specific insurance companies made their projections in the 
past, but we can consult the CMI reports as a “best practice” guide.  At discrete 
intervals the CMI produces “standard tables” usually through the medium of a 
CMI Report, accompanied by a software package for calculating certain 
functions based on the mortality data.  Recently the CMI has started producing 
Working Papers to supplement the Reports, partly so that information can be 
disseminated in a more timely manner (since Working Papers contain 
provisional results).  In addition to this Reports have  a semi-official status: for 
example, they are recognised by the regulatory authorities.  Since Working 
Papers do not have any official status they are a means of promoting  discussion 
within the actuarial profession while avoiding any obligation on actuaries to 
utilize results which are only provisional. The relevant tables for the sub-
periods in our sample are described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Data used by Continuous Mortality Investigation Committee of 
the actuarial professional organizations in the UK to calculate life tables 
Table Publication Publication 
Date 
Based on data 
up to year 
a(55)  1953 1948 
                                                           
11
 However, we cannot assume that an individual with lower life expectancy than average will 
necessarily get less additional utility from purchasing an annuity (based on average life 
expectancy) than an individual with higher life expectancy.  We discuss this below. 
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a(90) CMIR 3 1978 1974 
80 Table CMIR 10 1990 1982 
92 Table CMIR 17 1999 1994 
92 Table interim adjustments 
(with short, medium and long  
cohort assumptions) 
CMI WP 1 2002 1999 
00 Table CMIR WP 22 2006 2002 
 
Three different methodologies were used in the actuarial tables identified in 
Table 5, and we now describe these in turn.  In all cases the actuarial 
methodology relies upon the “mortality”, or probability of dying at a given 
point of time for someone of a given age (males and females are always treated 
separately).  Since the probability of dying at age 62 is very similar to the 
probability of dying at age 61, it seems reasonable to fit a smooth curve to the 
data (called a “graduation”), which summarises the mortality-age relationship 
and smoothes out idiosyncratic variations in the observed death rates.  
Differences in methodology depend primarily on the method of curve-fitting 
and how this is projected into the future.  Once we have suitable mortality 
projections, it is possible to calculate the probability of the annuitant receiving 
each annuity payment and hence the money’s worth of the annuity. To 
illustrate this, suppose we treat the data in discrete annual terms, and write 
( )txm ,  as the probability of dying (mortality) in year t of a person aged x.  Then 
the probability of being alive in year st +  is 
( ){ }
1
0
1 ,
i s
i
m x i t i
= −
=
− + +∏  
and the expected value of an annuity paying £1 per year is  
( ) ( ){ }
1
1 0
1 ,
i ss
s i
s m x i t iδ
= −=∞
= =
 
− + + 
 
∑ ∏  
where ( )sδ  is the net present value of £1 s  years hence. 
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Consider the mortality data available at some point in time, for example in 
1995.  If data were available up to 1994, then data would be available up to 1994 
for all ages.  To calculate the value of an annuity for a man aged 65 in 1995 it 
would be necessary to predict the mortality for a 65-year old in 1995, a 66-year 
old in 1996, a 67-year old in 1997 and so on.  The way that the 80 and 92 
Actuarial Tables would have done this is as follows: they would start by fitting a 
curve to mortality data for a particular year: for example in 1992 (which indeed 
is the base year in the 92 Tables, hence their name).  By looking at the trends of 
mortality for up to 1994, it would make predictions for the curve for years 1995 
and onwards and hence extract the relevant mortalities that would be needed. 
 
The 80 tables used 1980 as the base year and then projected mortality rates 
forward using a formulae such that the mortality at a given age in a given year 
was the 1980 mortality reduced by a “reduction factor”. This reduction factor 
consists of two parts:  a component determines the “limiting” reduction, ie how 
much the mortality is assumed to fall by in the indefinite future; and a second 
component determining how quickly the mortality is assumed to move from 
the 1980 value to the limiting value.  The speed of adjustment was independent 
of age in the 80 tables; but in the 92 tables both functions were made age 
dependent. Both of these tables viewed mortality as being based on age and 
time.  An alternative viewpoint is that mortality would depend upon age and 
cohort of birth.  For example, the base year graduation of 1992 used data on 
both 60-year olds in 1992 and 70-year olds in 1992: people born in 1932 and 1922 
respectively.  If mortality improvements were a smooth continuous process 
then the use of age and time instead of age and cohort would make no 
difference.  However, towards the end of the 1990s evidence began to appear 
suggesting that the mortality experience of people born before 1926 was 
markedly different from people born after 1926, a phenomenon which was first 
highlighted by Willets (1999).  In other words there was a discontinuity in the 
improvement of mortality and hence using age-time would result in different 
projections from using age-cohort. 
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To see why this matters, suppose, for the sake of argument, that people born 
after 1926 had substantially lower mortality than people born before.12  In 1992 
people aged 66 and younger belonged to the lower mortality cohorts and 
people aged 67 and over to the higher mortality cohorts.  The 80 and 92 tables 
would make mortality projections based on people born pre-1926, so mortality 
projections for a 65-year old man buying an annuity in 1995 would be based on 
post-1926 individuals’ cohorts only for years 1995 and 1996 and thereafter on 
people born pre-1926.   
 
Of course, one of the biggest problems in making such projections is the fact 
that when the 92 tables were produced there was hardly any information at all 
on the mortality of people born after 1926 during the later part of their lives.  
However, the CMI did have access to the mortality of such people in the earlier 
part of their lives, not from annuity data, but from life assurance data.  Using 
the Male mortality life insurance data (based on lives rather than amounts), 
revisions were made to the 92 tables which were published in 2002 and called 
the “interim adjustments”.13  The size of the revision depended upon the size 
and dating of the cohort effect and this cohort effect was difficult to estimate 
precisely on the data available.  Accordingly three different assumptions were 
made and three corresponding sets of revisions produced, called respectively 
the “short”, “medium” and “long” cohort assumptions.  The difference between 
these three assumptions is the point at which they assume that the 
improvement in mortality ceases to be relevant.  The short cohort projections 
assume that the mortality improvements observed in the post-1926 cohort cease 
to occur after 2010: the medium cohort projections assume 2020 and the long 
cohort projections assume 2040.  The differences between the medium cohort 
and long cohort are sufficiently far in the future that they make relatively little 
difference for immediate annuities (obviously they have much larger impacts 
                                                           
12
 Clearly every cohort has tended to show an improvement in mortality compared with the 
previous cohorts: someone born in 1925 tends to have lower mortality compared with someone 
born in 1924 and someone born in 1928 has lower mortality compared with someone born in 
1927.  The suggestion being made here is that the difference between the 1925 and 1926 cohorts 
was much larger. 
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for pensions still in accrual) and in our money’s worth calculations below we 
concentrate just on the short and long cohort projections. 
 
To give some idea of the magnitude of the changes due to revisions to the 
Actuarial Tables, the life expectancy of a 65-year old man (based on the 
projected mortalities) are illustrated in the Figure 10, based on the PML80 and 
PML92 Tables, and PML92 with the interim adjustments.  Life expectancy of a 
65-year old man was little more than 15 years in the mid 1990s and predicted to 
rise only slowly: shortly after 200 this had been revised upwards to about 22 
years, a huge change.  Also for comparison we show the life expectancy based 
on the personal pensioner males (PPM00) tables, based on the 2000 base tables 
and projected forward using the long cohort reduction factors, which suggest 
that personal pensioners have higher life expectancy than the life office 
pensioners. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 In producing these adjustments, the actuaries also used population data supplied by GAD. 
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Figure 10 
L Ife E xpec tanc y of Male, 65,
us ing  different mortality tables
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PML80 refers to Pensioner Male Lives from the 80 Tables, PML92 Pensioner Male Lives from 
the 92 Tables, Pensioner Male Lives from the 92 Tables with short and long cohort interim 
adjustments, and Personal Pensioner Males from the 00 Tables using a long cohort interim 
adjustment 
 
Alongside the concerns raised by the possibility of substantial cohort effects, 
actuaries have become increasingly concerned with the idea of making 
deterministic projections of mortality into the future, and have developed more 
sophisticated projection techniques, allowing for uncertainty in projections.  
One immediate consequence of this was that the 00 Tables, unlike the 80 and 
92 Tables, did not contain any suggested projections into the future at all.  
Instead, two complementary methods began to be employed to provide 
projections of mortality into the future, called p-spline and Lee-Carter.  The 
previous tables had used data to fit a curve to a cross-section of mortality 
experiences, implicitly a two-dimensional relationship.  The newer methods 
fitted a three-dimensional surface to the entire data that existed up to that 
point in time and then projected this surface into the future with appropriate 
statistical confidence intervals to provide a guide to the uncertainty of the 
estimates.  These methods are discussed in more detail in Cannon and Tonks 
(2008).  
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CMI Working Paper 20 considers the effects of incorporating these p-spline 
methods of projection, and computes the likely impact on annuity rates of 
using these newer methods relative to the previous methods. They find that 
using the p-spline methodology leads to much lower central estimates of the 
appropriate annuity rate for Males (although not Females). The key point, 
however, is that the 95 per cent confidence interval for the annuity rate based 
on the p-spline methodology is lower – for Males considerably lower – than that 
suggested by the Medium Cohort projections. The implication of this for our 
money’s worth calculations is that by moving from one methodology to another 
could reduce the apparent money’s worth by as much as 12 percentage points.  
We should be aware of this caveat when interpreting our money’s worth results 
 
5 MONEY’S WORTH RESULTS 
 
The results on the money’s worth calculations over various sub-periods of the 
data sample are presented in Tables 6- and Figures 11-. The general evidence is 
that money’s worth for both voluntary and compulsory markets is just less than 
unity, though in some periods 
 
5.1 Money’s worth of voluntary annuities 
Cannon and Tonks’ (2004a) estimates of the money’s worth for 65-year old 
males over the period 1957-2002 are reproduced in Table 6 and Figure 11, and 
this data has been updated to include the more recent evidence in the 2002-
2009 purchased life annuity quotes. The money’s worth is computed over 
different sub-samples, depending on the relevant actuarial tables, and in all 
cases the money’s worth is very close to unity, implying that annuities were 
sold at a rate which was approximately fair in actuarial terms.  The annuity 
quote data over the period 1957-1973 was obtained for 5-year guaranteed 
annuities, whereas post-1972 the quote data related to annuities without any 
guarantees. To obtain a single statistic on the money’s worth over the sample 
1957-2009 it is necessary to splice together the guaranteed and non-guaranteed 
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annuity series. We estimate that over the whole sample 1957-2009 the average 
money’s worth has been 0.983, which is not significantly different from unity, 
and constitutes surprisingly high value for money. Though we note that over 
the recent years, money’s worth of voluntary annuities has fallen to below 0.90. 
These money’s worth calculations are based on annuity rates which are 
themselves a simple average of different companies’ prices: the money’s worth 
for the companies quoting the highest rates would have been very good indeed. 
 
Table 6: Money’s Worth of UK Annuities, Male, Lives, aged 65 
 
Years Type of Annuity Actuarial 
Table 
Mean 
MW 
p-value 
1957-1973 no g'tee a(55) 1.034 0.078 
1972-1980 5-year g'tee a(55) 1.004 0.894 
1978-1991 5-year g'tee a(90) 0.978 0.057 
1990-1999 5-year g'tee IM80 0.985 0.296 
1999-2002 5-year g'tee IML92 0.938 0.023* 
2001-2007 No g’tee IML92  
long cohort 
0.928 0.072 
2005-2009 No g’tee IML00  
long cohort 
0.859 ? 
1957-2009 No g’tee spliced 
with 5-year g’tee 
various 0.983 ? 
Table computes the money’s worth over different sub-samples of the dataset. The p-value 
reports a two-tailed t-test for whether the average money's worth is significantly different from 
unity. * denotes significance at the 5%.  p-values are robust to serial correlation.. 
Source: Cannon and Tonks (2004a) updated and revised 
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Figure 11 
Money's Worth (Male 65)
UK Voluntary Purchase
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5.2 Money’s worth of pension annuities (compulsory purchase) 
We now turn to the money’s worth of pension annuities in the compulsory 
purchase market. We will spend more time discussing these results, as we 
explained in Section 4 the data for the CPA market over the period 1994-2009 is 
from a single data supplier, and also as we know from the evidence in Figure 1, 
this market is much larger and more important than the voluntary market.  
 
We first provide a comparison of money’s worth based on mortality of male 
lives, in Table 7 and Figure 12 using the contemporary actuarial tables discussed 
above.  Since it is impossible to date the precise point at which one should 
move from one life table to another we allow overlap years.  The main feature of 
this graph is one which we shall find in the other graphs too: although the 
money’s worth is close to unity, for any given life table, money’s worth appears 
to be falling over time: for example, using the PML80 table, the money’s worth 
falls from 90 per cent to 88 per cent over the period 1994 to 2000.  However, on 
moving to the PML92 table, the money’s worth rises from 88 per cent to 96 per 
cent in 2000.  Almost certainly the gradual decline we appear to observe when 
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using the PML80 table is due to life insurers pricing in higher life expectancy 
and anticipating the newer mortality tables on the basis of private information.  
The only new mortality table which makes little difference is the 00 Table, but 
this is unsurprising since it follows on so quickly from the interim adjustments 
to the 92 Table.14  
 
Table 7: Money’s worth 65 year old Male Level CPA, Lives 
Year Summary 
Money’s 
worth of 
annuities 
PML80 PML92 PML92 
short 
cohort 
PML92 
long 
cohort 
PNML00 
short 
cohort 
PNML00 
long 
cohort 
1994 0.875 0.875      
1995 0.910 0.910      
1996 0.884 0.884      
1997 0.899 0.899      
1998 0.886 0.886      
1999 0.931 0.863 0.931     
2000 0.951 0.876 0.951     
2001 0.912  0.912     
2002 0.947  0.860 0.920 0.975   
2003 0.908  0.822 0.880 0.936   
2004 0.850   0.824 0.876   
2005 0.860   0.836 0.891 0.832 0.888 
2006 0.852   0.827 0.883 0.824 0.880 
2007 0.823   0.800 0.851 0.797 0.848 
2008 0.855   0.831 0.884 0.828 0.882 
2009 0.879   0.857 0.908 0.854 0.905 
OVERALL 
MW 0.889       
Column labeled PML80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
Pensioners Male Lives 80 Tables; PML92 calculates money’s worth from the Pensioner Male 
Lives 92 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments. PNML00 calculates money’s 
worth from the Pensioner Normal Male Lives 00 Tables, with short and long cohort interim 
adjustments.  The first column shows the summary money’s worth value for each year, using 
the appropriate life expectancy figures for the relevant years: where there is more than one 
estimate for a year the summary column takes simple averages. 
 
                                                           
14
 As we have noted already, the 00 Table does not have projections: to calculate these figures 
we apply the interim adjustments to the realised mortality in 2000.  This is a further reason why 
our two sets of projections are so close. 
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Figure 12 
Money's Worth for Male, 65, Level Annuity, 
using "Lives" Mortality
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Figure plots the money’s worth values from columns 2-7 of Table 7. PML80 refers to Pensioner 
Male Lives from the 80 Tables, PML92 Pensioner Male Lives from the 92 Tables, Pensioner 
Male Lives from the 92 Tables with short and long cohort interim adjustments, and Pensioner 
Normal Male Lives from the 00 Tables using short and long cohort interim adjustments. 
 
The first column in Table 7, computes a summary of the money’s worth of 65-
year old males using the combination of life tables in Figure 11, to give our 
estimate of the change in money’s worth over the sample. The money’s worth 
for a 65-year old male has averaged 88.9 per cent over the period 1994-2009.  
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Table 8 and Figure 13 shows similar results when the money’s worth is based on 
mortality by amounts.  As discussed above, richer people tend to live longer 
and so when we take an expectation of life weighted by pension size the life 
expectancy is longer and the money’s worth is higher.  Using the PMA table, 
the money’s worth is 94 per cent in 1994, falling to between 88 per cent and 93 
per cent, depending on whether one uses the short or long cohort assumption.  
This is uniformly considerably higher than for the figures obtained in the 
previous Graph using the PML table.  From the point of view of the life insurers’ 
profits it is the money’s worth weighted by pension that matters and these 
figures suggest that annuity business has not been excessively profitable.  There 
has been a fall in the money’s worth but the change could be consistent more 
appropriate pricing of the riskiness of  annuities due to greater uncertainty over 
life expectancy.15 
 
                                                           
15
 The Board of Actuarial Standards (2008) have recently issued a paper on the uncertainty in forecasts 
of mortality rates, emphasizing that there is no consensus on the best type of model to use for 
deriving assumptions about future changes in mortality. 
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Table 8: Money’s worth 65 year old Male Level CPA, Amounts 
Year Summary 
Money’s 
worth of 
annuities 
PMA80 PMA92 PMA92 
short 
cohort 
PMA92 
long 
cohort 
PNMA00 
short 
cohort 
PNMA00 
long 
cohort 
1994 0.914 0.914      
1995 0.951 0.951      
1996 0.922 0.922      
1997 0.941 0.941      
1998 0.931 0.931      
1999 0.989 0.908 0.989     
2000 1.011 0.923 1.011     
2001 0.966  0.966     
2002 0.991  0.911 0.963 1.018   
2003 0.950  0.871 0.922 0.978   
2004 0.888   0.862 0.914   
2005 0.892   0.874 0.929 0.865 0.920 
2006 0.884   0.865 0.921 0.856 0.912 
2007 0.852   0.835 0.886 0.827 0.877 
2008 0.885   0.867 0.920 0.859 0.911 
2009 0.910   0.894 0.943 0.885 0.935 
OVERALL 
MW 0.930       
Column labeled PMA80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
Pensioners Male Amounts 80 Tables; PMA92 calculates money’s worth from the Pensioner 
Male Amounts 92 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments. PNMA00 calculates 
money’s worth from the Pensioner Normal Male Amounts 00 Tables, with short and long 
cohort interim adjustments.  The first column shows the summary money’s worth value for 
each year, using the appropriate life expectancy figures based on amounts of annuities for the 
relevant years 
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Figure 13 
Money's Worth for Male, 65, Level Annuity, 
using "Amounts" mortality
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Figure plots the money’s worth values from columns 2-7 of Table 8. PMA80 refers to Pensioner 
Male Amounts from the 80 Tables, PMA92 Pensioner Male Amounts from the 92 Tables, 
Pensioner Male Amounts from the 92 Tables with short and long cohort interim adjustments, 
and Pensioner Normal Male Amounts from the 00 Tables using short and long cohort interim 
adjustments. 
 
Table 9 and Figure 14 illustrates similar results for women, although, 
interestingly women always tend to have higher money’s worth, suggesting that 
the actuaries are underestimating women’s life expectancy. The money’s worth 
for a 65-year old female has averaged 89.8 per cent over the period 1994-2009. 
So although we saw in Section 4 that females at each age receive lower annuity 
rates than males, the value-for-money of female pension annuities is higher. 
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Table 9: Money’s worth 65-year old Female Level CPA, Lives  
Year Summary 
Money’s 
worth of 
annuities 
PFL80 PFL92 PFL92 
short 
cohort 
PFL92 
long 
cohort 
PNFL00 
short 
cohort 
PNFL00 
long 
cohort 
1994 0.891 0.891      
1995 0.931 0.931      
1996 0.897 0.897      
1997 0.924 0.924      
1998 0.918 0.918      
1999 0.920 0.895 0.920     
2000 0.954 0.924 0.954     
2001 0.921  0.921     
2002 0.947  0.879 0.923 0.972   
2003 0.911  0.843 0.886 0.937   
2004 0.868   0.844 0.892   
2005 0.860   0.844 0.894 0.835 0.884 
2006 0.851   0.834 0.885 0.826 0.876 
2007 0.825   0.810 0.856 0.802 0.847 
2008 0.862   0.847 0.895 0.838 0.886 
2009 0.887   0.873 0.919 0.865 0.910 
OVERALL 
MW 0.898       
Column labeled PFL80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
Pensioners Female Lives 80 Tables; PFL92 calculates money’s worth from the Pensioner Female Lives 
92 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments. PNFL00 calculates money’s worth from 
the Pensioner Normal Female Lives 00 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments.  The 
first column shows the summary money’s worth value for each year, using the appropriate life 
expectancy figures for the relevant years. 
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Figure 14 
Money's  Worth for F emale, 65, L evel A nnuity, us ing  "L ives " 
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Figure plots the money’s worth values from columns 2-7 of Table 10. PFL80 refers to Pensioner 
Female Lives from the 80 Tables, PFL92 Pensioner Female Lives from the 92 Tables, Pensioner 
Female Lives from the 92 Tables with short and long cohort interim adjustments, and Pensioner 
Normal Female Lives from the 00 Tables using short and long cohort interim adjustments 
 
 
 
Table 10 and Figure 15 turns to RPI-linked or real annuities, for which we only 
have data for 1999 onwards.  The money’s worth is always lower for such 
annuities: compare the money’s worth of 94 per cent for a nominal and 90 
pence for an RPI-linked annuity for a 65-year old man in 1999.  Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002) suggest this is due to selection effects, as longer lived people 
would be more likely to choose real to nominal annuities.  However, the 
discrepancy has more than doubled since 1999: using the 00 table with the long 
cohort projection the money’s worth are 90 per cent for nominal and 80 per 
cent for RPI-linked.  It is implausible to suggest that this is entirely due to 
selection effects and this raises the question of whether other issues, such as 
higher costs of inflation-proofing annuities, are the major cause of the 
difference in the money’s worth. 
 
Table 10: Money’s worth 65-year old Male Real (RPI--linked) CPA, Lives 
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Year Summary 
Money’s 
worth of 
annuities 
PML80 PML92 PML92 
short 
cohort 
PML92 
long 
cohort 
PNML00 
short 
cohort 
PNML00 
long 
cohort 
1999 0.891 0.812 0.891     
2000 0.876 0.794 0.876     
2001 0.831  0.831     
2002 0.902  0.797 0.864 0.940   
2003 0.856  0.756 0.820 0.893   
2004 0.813   0.777 0.850   
2005 0.779   0.744 0.817 0.742 0.815 
2006 0.768   0.732 0.808 0.730 0.806 
2007 0.754   0.719 0.792 0.717 0.791 
2008 0.816   0.774 0.861 0.772 0.860 
2009 0.759   0.724 0.798 0.722 0.796 
OVERALL 
MW 0.822       
Column labeled PML80 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
Pensioners Male Lives 80 Tables; PML92 calculates money’s worth from the Pensioner Male 
Lives 92 Tables, with short and long cohort interim adjustments. PNML00 calculates money’s 
worth from the Pensioner Normal Males Lives 00 Tables, with short and long cohort interim 
adjustments.  The first column shows the summary money’s worth value for each year, using 
the appropriate life expectancy figures for the relevant years 
 
Figure 15 
Money's Worth for Male, 65, Real Annuity, using "Lives" Mortality
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Figure plots the money’s worth values from columns 2-7 of Table 11. PML80 refers to Pensioner 
Male Lives from the 80 Tables, PML92 Pensioner Male Lives from the 92 Tables, Pensioner 
Male Lives from the 92 Tables with short and long cohort interim adjustments, and Pensioner 
Normal Male Lives from the 00 Tables using short and long cohort interim adjustments 
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Table 11 and Figure 16 provide the most dramatic revision to our estimates of 
the money’s worth.  In our discussion of life tables we have already seen that 
there is considerable variation in the life expectancy of different groups of 
pensioners.  Until this point we have continued to follow Finkelstein and 
Poterba in using Life Office Pensioner mortality to calculate the money’s worth. 
However, although members of occupational pension schemes may top up their 
pensions with defined contribution AVCs (additional voluntary contributions), 
these members of defined benefit schemes are likely to have different 
characteristics to those people who are buying a pension annuity (Cocco and 
Lopes, 2004; Brander and Finucane, 2007).   
 
Table 11: Money’s worth 65-year old Male Level CPA, Various lives assumptions 
Year PML92 PML92 
long 
cohort 
RMV92 RMV92 
long 
cohort 
PPM00 
long 
cohort 
1999 0.931  1.001   
2000 0.951  1.026   
2001 0.912  0.978   
2002 0.860 0.975 0.922 1.031  
2003 0.822 0.936 0.883 0.992  
2004  0.876  0.926  
2005  0.891  0.943 0.946 
2006  0.883  0.935 0.940 
2007  0.851  0.898 0.904 
2008  0.884  0.933 0.941 
2009  0.908  0.955 0.964 
Column labeled PML92 shows money’s worth calculated using life expectancy data from the 
Pensioners Male Lives 92 Tables; and from the Pensioner Male Lives 92 Tables, with short and 
long cohort interim adjustments. RMV92 calculates money’s worth from the Retirement 
Annuity Contract Males Lives 00 Tables, and from the Retirement Annuity Contract Males 
Lives 00 Tables with long cohort interim adjustments; PPM00 calculates money’s worth from 
the Personal Pensioner Males Lives 00 Tables with long cohort interim adjustments.  
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Figure 16 
Money's  Worth for Male, 65, L evel A nnuity,
us ing  different mortality tables
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Figure plots the money’s worth values from Table 12. PML92 refers to Pensioner Male Lives 
from the 92 Tables, and from the 92 Tables with long cohort interim adjustments, RMV92 
Retirement Annuity Contract from the 92 Tables, and from the 92 Tables with long cohort 
interim adjustments, PPM00 Personal Pensions Male Lives from the 00 Tables with long cohort 
interim adjustments 
 
So in Table 11 and Figure 16 we now consider the effect of using the mortality of 
people with Retirement Annuitant Contracts, and for the few years that they 
are available, the data based on Personal Pensioners.  Using these tables adds 
just over five pence to the money’s worth, suggesting that the money’s worth 
was actually greater than one in 2000 and 2002.   These figures suggest that 
annuities have been very good value for the typical annuitant.   
 
The most recent revisions to mortality projections by the actuarial profession 
have been published (in provisional form) in CMI Working Paper 20.  These 
projections are not provided as a central projection but as a distribution or 
projections.  In other words they attempt to model the uncertainty about the 
projections (as is conventional in the finance literature).  The amount of 
uncertainty shown by these projections suggests that the 95% confidence 
interval for annuity prices (the reciprocal of the money’s worth) is about 6 per 
cent: ie that the money’s worth could be up to 3 per cent higher or lower than 
the central projection.  This is clearly a large range of uncertainty.  We have not 
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incorporated these uncertainties into our projections, because there is some 
doubt as to whether these are the real ranges of uncertainty – the actuarial 
profession itself is still looking at new techniques for measuring this. 
 
6 DISCUSSION 
 
We conclude our analysis with a brief comparison of our money’s worth 
calculations with the money’s worth of other insurance products and then 
discuss possible explanations for the decline in the money’s worth. 
 
6.1 Evaluation of the money’s worth 
 
The numbers for the money’s worth of pension annuities for males have 
averaged around 90 per cent over the period 1994-2009. As we have discussed 
in Section 4, it is difficult to evaluate the money’s worth figure because we 
cannot obtain information on the costs of life insurers.  One possible means of 
evaluating money’s worth figures is to compare the money’s worth on annuities 
with analogous figures for other forms of insurance. The ABI have provided us 
with estimates of the premiums paid, and the claims made for a number of 
insurance markets: motor, domestic property and commercial property 
insurance over the period 1994-2005. The ratio of the value of claims to 
premiums paid is a crude measure of the money’s worth of these insurance 
products. We plot these ratios for each year, for level annuities for 65 year-old 
males, and for the three general insurance products in Figure 17. It can be seen 
that the money’s worth of annuities is consistently higher than the other 
insurance products. There was only a brief period in the late 1990s when motor 
insurance was better value than annuities. 
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Figure 18: Money’s worth of Annuities and Claims Ratios for Motor, 
Domestic and Commercial Property Insurance 
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Source: ABI 
 
 
James (2000) examines the cost of investing in a variety of retail investment 
products in the UK, and finds that to get the market rate of return on £1, a 
consumer would have to invest £1.50 in a managed fund, and between £1.10 and 
£1.25 in an index tracker. These figures imply a money’s worth of 66 per cent for 
a managed fund, and less than 91 per cent for a tracker.  This suggests that it is 
during the accumulation phase that charges from the insurance companies 
have a significant reduction on the effective rate of return and not in the 
decumulation phase. 
 
6.2 Possible explanations for the decline in the money’s worth 
 
Notwithstanding the high value for money of annuities relative to other 
insurance and financial products, the evidence in Figure 12, is that the money’s 
worth of annuities has fallen slightly over the sample. We now discuss various 
factors that could explain this recent decline:  
• Insurance regulation 
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• Concentration in the insurance industry  
• Insurance cycle 
• Pricing of mortality uncertainty 
• Impaired lives 
 
6.2.1 Insurance Regulation  
 
An important development during the sample period has been the changes to 
life insurance regulation since 2002. Life insurers in the UK are regulated by the 
UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), which incorporates the European 
Union Life Directives for the insurance industry.  As explained in Jordon (2006) 
the bases of insurance regulation are prudential requirements, meaning that 
the regulations require insurance companies to have sufficient financial 
resources to provide for its liabilities. The FSA’s General Prudential Sourcebook 
GENPRU 2.1.8 implements the minimum EU standards for the capital resources 
required to be held by an insurer undertaking life business. These EU Life 
Directives set the base capital (currently) at Euros 3.2 million, and the 
percentage of capital that must be set against technical reserves to cover four 
risk components: death risks; expense risks; market risks and health risks. In 
the case of annuities, the amount of capital set aside to cover liabilities is a total 
of 4% of the mathematical reserves.  
 
Anticipating a move to a more risk-sensitive EU regulatory approach in the 
proposed Solvency II, and also because a number of events specific to the UK’s 
insurance industry16, the FSA has proceeded with its own risk-based solvency 
requirements, in part anticipating the likely Solvency II rules (FSA 2003, 2005). 
This new regime may have increased the regulatory cost associated with 
providing annuities, by imposing higher levels of regulatory capital on annuity 
providers. 
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6.2.2 Concentration in the insurance industry.  
 
We have seen that in Figure 8, although there has been a number of mergers 
within the life insurance industry over the last ten years, industry concentration 
has not altered greatly, with the six-firm concentration ratio averaging around 
58 per cent since 1985 with no discernable trend. There is no evidence of 
monopoly pricing within the industry, and the industry has witnessed some 
new entrants, but the small number of annuity providers remains a potential 
cause for concern, given the projected increase in annuity demand reported by 
the Pension Commission in Table 1.  The FSA comparative tables provide 
information on annuity rates in the CPA market, which enables consumers to 
be kept aware of price dispersion and in principle can use the open-market 
option to obtain the best annuity rates.  
 
6.2.3 Insurance Cycle  
 
There is a wide literature referring to a phenomenon called the “insurance 
cycle” (surveyed in Harrington, 2004).  This refers to the tendency of insurers to 
increase their premia after periods when negative shocks have resulted in ex 
post losses, resulting in significant reductions in capital.  Since it appears that 
life insurers may have been making ex post losses on annuities over some of this 
period, due to unanticipated reductions in mortality (ie when the money’s 
worth was above unity), the observed reductions in annuity rates may be an 
example of the insurance cycle. 
 
Standard economic theory suggests that insurers would be unable to increase 
prices to recoup losses after a negative shock, due to competitive pressures.  
However, more sophisticated theories suggest that increasing premia may be 
rational: first, the negative shock may have resulted in rational up-dating of 
probabilities and hence life insurers reduced their projections of mortality by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16
 Including the closure of Equitable Life, the Baird Report, the Sandler Review of Medium and 
Long-term savings in the UK, a number of high profile compliance failings, and the fall in 
equity values after 2000. 
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more than suggested in the CMI reports; secondly, the negative shock would 
have resulted in a reduction in life insurers’ capital on annuities in payment 
which could not be replaced in the short term, or which could only be replaced 
at relatively high cost. 
 
6.2.4 Pricing of mortality uncertainty  
 
We have already discussed changes in actuarial methodology and how the most 
recent estimates attempt to include both cohort effects and estimates of the 
uncertainty in mortality projections.  Setting aside the issue of cohort effects, 
pricing cohort-mortality uncertainty into annuity premia would tend to result 
in lower annuity rates.  For example, suppose the annuity rate was set to be 
actuarially fair based on the best, or central estimate, of future mortality rates.  
Then, roughly speaking the life insurer would make a profit about half of the 
time and a loss about half of the time (with a very small chance of exactly 
breaking even).  In an ideal world the life insurer might hedge this cohort 
mortality risk, but this would involve payment of a premium and would lower 
the money’s worth since: in fact secondary markets for such risk are negligible, 
so the life insurer has to bear this risk. 
 
One strategy to cover this risk would be to set an annuity rate so that the life 
insurer would be 90 per cent sure that enough funds were available to meet the 
liabilities.  This would involve setting an annuity rate based not on the central 
estimate of future mortality rates, but on the 90th centile of future estimates.  
Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2007) show how appropriate centiles can be 
calculated (which they present using “fan charts”).  The resulting annuity rate 
would not be actuarially fair but would limit the risk to the life insurer.   
 
During the period that we have been considering it is probable that life insurers 
have been paying more explicit attention to cohort mortality risk.  Since our 
money’s worth estimates in this paper are based on central estimates, any move 
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by life insurers from an actuarially-fair pricing policy to a more conservative 
pricing policy would appear as a reduction in the money’s worth. 
 
In April 2007, the FSA sent a “Dear CEO” letter to chief executives of annuity 
providers, reflecting on the debate over future annuitant longevity 
improvements. The letter recognized that companies would usually make 
assumptions based on their own mortality experiences,  
 
“However, if this is not possible we would expect firms to consider the different 
industry views in this area and to err on the side of caution” (FSA Dear CEO 
letter, April 2007 
 
In other words annuity providers, according to the regulator, should price 
annuities conservatively to reflect the risk of mortality improvements. These 
concerns on the appropriate pricing on risk, have been echoed by the Governor 
of the Bank of England in a paper submitted to the Treasury Committee 
explaining the turmoil in financial markets. The paper concludes that the 2007 
credit crisis had been caused by financial institutions under-pricing risk: 
 
“The key objectives remain, . . . .ensuring that the financial system continues to 
function effectively, including the proper pricing of risk. If risk continues to be 
under-priced, the next period of turmoil will be on an even bigger scale. The 
current turmoil, which has at its heart the earlier under-pricing of risk, has 
disturbed the unusual serenity of recent years, . . .” (King, 2007  [10]) 
 
The implication is that institutions should ensure that risk is appropriately 
priced, to ensure stability of the financial system. 
 
6.2.5 Impaired Lives  
 
According to Quinton (2003), there was an increase in the impaired life market 
of 23 per cent between 2001 and 2002.  In 2005, the Synthesis database reports 
that of £8.5 billion sales of CPA annuities only £386 million (4.5 per cent) were 
impaired life.  According to Ainslie (2000), the impaired life annuity market 
needs a market share of 7.5 per cent per annum to be a viable business model, 
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but once it achieves this level, it will have an impact on the profitability of the 
remaining standard model. Our estimates of money’s worth make no allowance 
for any growth in the impaired life market, since the life tables that we use are 
unable to distinguish between impaired and non-impaired lives.  This growth in 
the impaired life market would have resulted in the remaining annuitants in 
the conventional market having average lower mortality.  If life insurers priced 
this information into annuities, they would have been assuming lower mortality 
than in the standard tables: this could have explained a decline in our measure 
of the money’s worth.  
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has examined a time series of voluntary and compulsory pension 
annuity rates in the UK for the sample periods 1957-2009 (PLA market) and 
1994-2009 (CPA market). The paper computes the money’s worth of annuities, 
and finds that on average the money’s worth in the voluntary market over the 
sample period for 65-year old males has been a very high 98%. In the larger 
compulsory pension annuity over a shorter sample period we estimate that the 
money’s worth for 65-year old males has been 89%, and for 65-year old females 
has been a similar but slightly larger 90%.  Taking into account load factors 
associated with annuity contracts and in comparison with other financial and 
insurance products this implies that annuities are fairly priced. However the 
value of the money’s worth is sensitive to the assumptions made about life 
expectancy, and we explained the assumptions made about the appropriate life 
tables to apply to annuitants in the compulsory annuity market. There is some 
evidence that money’s worth has fallen since 2002. We discussed a number of 
factors that could have effected the fall in money’s worth, including: changes in 
insurance regulation; changes in industrial concentration; life expectancy 
shocks and the insurance cycle; pricing of mortality uncertainty and the growth 
in the impaired lives market.  
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i
Although the relative importance of interest rates of different maturities varies 
between annuities purchased for different ages  
ii
 If longevity increased so much that annuitants were immortal, the annuity rate and 
the consol rate would be the same, since the two products would be virtually identical. 
iii In their analysis of money’s worth, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) use the return on corporate bonds 
as a deflator rather than government bonds. 
 
